Theses on the Imperialism of European Finance Capital


Theses on the Imperialism of European Finance Capital

Produced by Herr Max von Sylt & Social Praxis on behalf of the Theory Formation Committee of the European Popular Front.

Preamble

These theses begin from a different premise than most debates concerning the future of Europe. Such debates commonly contrast greater integration to renewed national sovereignty, austerity to public investment, and the existing market-centred Union to the possibility of a “social Europe.” Although these disagreements may be politically significant, they fundamentally begin from a shared assumption: that European institutions can be understood independently of the capitalist relations they organise.

Our purpose is therefore not to propose another bourgeois institutional design for Europe. It is to examine the material basis of European integration as well as the class and social relations expressed through its institutions. We ask why European capital required a single market, a common legal framework and, for many member states, a common currency; how these arrangements distribute power among classes and states; and why neither the integration of the European Union nor a return to national sovereignty can, by itself, overcome capitalist exploitation.

The European Union is frequently described as the political achievement through which a continent formerly divided by war established peace and cooperation. This account identifies a real change in relations among the major European states, but it does not fully explain how that change became possible or whose interests it has served. European military interventions abroad, the creditor policies imposed during the eurozone crisis, and the unequal organisation of labour and investment within the single market suggest that peace among the principal member states has not meant the disappearance of coercion. Rather, coercion has assumed new institutional, economic and geographical forms.

The following analysis therefore examines European integration as a historical response to the requirements of European capital after 1945. It considers both the common interests that encourage European bourgeoisies to cooperate and the national rivalries that prevent their complete political unification. The central question is not whether the European Union is simply national or supranational, federation, confederation or something in between, but how these various dimensions coexist and competencies interact within a developing imperialist formation.

Part One: The doctrine of finance capital


Capital, as Marx described it, is a social relation in which value grows by swallowing the unpaid labour of the proletariat, and it recognises no homeland and no limit beyond the mass of surplus value it can extract. Its drive to concentrate and centralise was laid bare long before the first joint-stock bank opened its doors in Paris or Berlin. The small capitals are eaten by the large, and the large merge into combinations that command whole branches of industry and whole national markets, a process that no anti-trust office has ever halted for longer than it takes to draft the next merger.


At a certain point in this growth, bank capital and industrial capital fuse into a single power. Hilferding called it finance capital in 1910, and Lenin drew his political conclusion six years later, in the middle of the slaughter that finance capital had prepared. The bank ceases to be a lender standing beside industry; it becomes its owner, its organiser and its general staff, and the export of capital comes to outweigh the export of goods. The world is shared out among the great financial combines, and its territory among the great powers that stand behind them and uphold their privileges, and this stage, which Lenin named imperialism, belongs to capitalism as old age belongs to a living body, as a condition reached through maturity, from which there is no road back to youth.


The bourgeois intellectual objects: “Lenin wrote about a vanished world of cartels, colonies and gunboats; today we live among open markets, multilateral institutions and rules.” He confuses the method with the purpose. Colonies were one historical means of securing finance capital's claims over foreign labour and foreign soil; investment treaties, debt conditionality, currency pegs, privatisation programmes, and free trade agreements are others, more elegant, better lawyered, and every bit as effective. Through all of them, capital accumulated in the metropoles appropriates the surplus value produced in the peripheries, and metropolitan states guarantee that appropriation with their law, their money, and, when the hour comes, their arms.


Europe supplies the proof in figures its own financial press prints with pride. At the end of 2025, BNP Paribas overtook HSBC to become the largest bank on the continent, with total assets of about $3.28 trillion, followed by Crédit Agricole with some $3.15 trillion and Santander with about $2.25 trillion, while the French banks among Europe's fifty largest held about $12.5 trillion between them. Each sum exceeds the annual product of most of the world's states, and each consists of claims on wage earners who must repay their mortgages, on firms that must service their loans, and on governments that must pay interest from taxes levied on those same wage earners. In 2025 European banks completed a record wave of mergers, ten deals above a billion euros each, worth almost €46 billion together, and the European authorities applauded every one; how could they not, seeing the engines of national imperialism thrive? After all, such capital needs the state as a creditor needs a bailiff. Property exists only as a relation enforced by violence, and a mortgage on a Romanian flat, a factory in Slovakia, a uranium mine in Niger, a concession on Greek airports or a stake in a Mexican bank is worth something only so long as courts, police, currency and, where necessary, soldiers guarantee that the profit can be collected and carried home. The further capital spreads beyond its native soil, the stronger the state it requires, a state able to make foreign governments respect its claims, and imperialism names precisely this requirement once it has been translated into foreign policy.


However, following this proven model, after 1945, the European bourgeoisies found themselves caught in a material contradiction. Their capitals were among the most concentrated in the world, while their states lay broken by two world wars, Britain and France losing their empires, Germany occupied and split in two, Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands reduced to the second rank, all of them sheltering under American arms and inside a monetary order built on the dollar. European integration was the answer these bourgeoisies gave to their predicament: Their national states survived it intact, and gained a common instrument through which each could pursue ambitions on a scale none could reach alone.


Hence the endless academic dispute over whether the Union is a supranational state or an association of governments, a dispute as fruitful as the medieval argument over the number of angels on a pin. The Union is both at once, and the friction between the two forms its ordinary way of life, a reality even the German Constitutional Court realised, having characterised the EU as a Staatenverbund (an association of sovereign states, a term that resolutely refuses to hold stable definition) even from a bourgeois legalist standpoint. The member states pool their sovereignty wherever pooling strengthens each against the rest of the world, and they withhold it wherever they compete with one another, and European finance capital, which is European: French, German, Italian, Austrian, Spanish and Dutch all at the same time, finds in this arrangement the political shape that fits its own double nature like a glove.


Any critique of the Union therefore has little to do with its institutions, for these are no more than the outward garment of the great European cartel. To lament over the Union's "democratic deficit", its bureaucrats, or its remoteness from the citizens targets the dress, not the body beneath it. Whoever wants to analyse the Union must observe that it is, reduced to its core, the public presentation of the underlying mechanism of 21st-century European finance capital. The European Union is fundamentally incapable of producing a democracy that supersedes the nature of its economic body; the dress will always follow the form. 


This does not mean that the dress is a matter of indifference to the proletariat. The garment is cut to fit the body, and it is cut so as to leave the working class no seam it could tear. The Union is no state in the classical sense but a transnational bureaucratic and legal apparatus, and questions that form the substance of politics in any national state, from the movement of capital to the size of a budget deficit and the permissibility of a strike, have been removed from the reach of elections and written into treaty law, where they are administered as matters of legal compliance instead of being decided as matters of power. National ministers legislate in the Council and in closed trilogues, then return home to blame Brussels for what they themselves decided, while the Commission and the Court point in turn to the treaties the member states signed. Responsibility lies everywhere and therefore nowhere, and there exists no single seat of political power that a majority of the working class could win, hold to account or replace. A party of the left that wins a national election finds, as Athens did in 2015, that the decisive questions were never on the ballot, and a strike won at the national level can be undone in Luxembourg. The treaties themselves can only be changed by the unanimous consent of every member government and the ratification of every member state, so that the form is protected against amendment from within as firmly as the property it guards. The dress cannot be altered, only torn off; but whoever means to tear it off must know exactly how it is stitched together, and it is against precisely this structure that the demands at the end of these theses are directed.

Part Two: The single market as the charter of capital


The jurists of the Union recite the four freedoms with the solemnity of a creed, the free movement of goods, of services, of persons and of capital, and they teach them to third-semester legal students as though they were the divine providence of a monarch. Read with open eyes, they turn out to be the rights of property, obscured and cloned, to safeguard every aspect of the present system. Each of them removed a national barrier that stood between a sum of money and its most profitable investment anywhere on the continent, and the worker received his freedom to move mainly so that capital could leave him behind without paying for the privilege or, on the other hand, enable the national bourgeoisies to enjoy a much broader labour market for them to exploit.


The order in which these freedoms arrived tells its own story. The Treaty of Rome in 1957 created a customs union for the exporting industries of West Germany, France and the Benelux, while the movement of capital stayed fenced in by national controls for three decades, because each bourgeoisie still wished to guard its own banks and its own exchange rate. Only with the Single European Act of 1986 and the capital movements directive of 1988 did the member states commit to full liberalisation, and the Maastricht Treaty then went further than any earlier instrument of international law, forbidding restrictions on capital flows among the member states and between them and the whole world besides. The rule stands today in Article 63 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Goods from outside meet a common tariff, workers from outside meet razor wire and Frontex patrols, and capital alone may come and go as it pleases, welcomed at every border like a visiting prince.


The European Court of Justice in Luxembourg has executed this charter with a zeal worthy of a better cause. In its Viking and Laval judgments of 2007, it held that strikes and collective agreements could amount to unlawful restrictions on the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services. A Finnish shipping company had reflagged its ferry to Estonia in order to pay Estonian wages, a Latvian building firm had brought Latvian workers to Sweden on Latvian terms, and the unions that resisted them were told by the Court to justify themselves before the freedoms of capital. Rarely has the bourgeois order spoken so plainly, placing the right of capital to chase the cheapest labour above the right of labour to defend its price.


The rules on state aid are sold to the public as the guarantee of fair competition, since no government may tilt the market by subsidising its own firms. In practice they bind the weak and spare the strong. When Berlin poured hundreds of billions into its banks in 2008 and into its energy-hungry industry in 2022, Brussels found every exemption required, and when the American Inflation Reduction Act threatened to lure industrial capital across the Atlantic, the Commission loosened its own rules so that member states could bid for factories with public money. The states with room in their budgets, Germany and France at their head, received the factories, and the states without it received sermons on fiscal discipline.


Having established the political dimensions of the single market, we must now address its ongoing incompleteness from the perspective of finance capital. For finance capital in the narrow sense, the single market remains unfinished business. Brussels complains without pause that Europe's capital markets are split along national lines, that the savings of European households doze in deposit accounts or wander off to Wall Street when they ought to be financing European expansion. Mario Draghi's report of 2024 put the investment requirement at €750 to 800 billion a year, and the Commission has answered with a "Savings and Investments Union", the newest name for the old project of a Capital Markets Union. Its declared aim is to steer the savings of wage earners, above all their pension money, into the share and bond markets where European capital raises funds for its expansion at home and abroad, and the officials who promote it speak of "mobilising" household savings in the tone of a general calling up the reserves for the next offensive.

Turned outward, the single market becomes a weapon, and a weapon with two edges, the first of which the jurist Anu Bradford christened the "Brussels effect", meaning the process by which European rules on data, chemicals, food safety and competition become the rules of the world market without a single treaty being signed, simply because no exporter can afford to lose access to 450 million consumers with high purchasing power, so that producers in Shenzhen, Bangalore and São Paulo adopt the European standard rather than run two production lines, and foreign legislators copy it so that their own firms may go on selling into Europe. The scholars of European integration admire all this as soft power, as the gentle persuasion of a civilian power leading by example, though its softness lasts only as long as the other side remains a good and obedient exploitee who does as he is told, and behind every act of persuasion stands the closed door of the market.

The second edge is older and cruder, and it goes by the name of protectionism, since a consumer market swollen by a century of tribute from the periphery is the most precious possession of European capital, and the regulations that guard its entrance serve just as well to keep out anyone who might compete for it. As early as 2001 a study of the World Bank estimated that the Union's limits on aflatoxin in nuts and grains, stricter than the international standard, would cost African exporters some $670 million a year in exchange for a gain in public health so small it could barely be measured, and the newest instruments of Brussels carry the same logic onto a far larger scale. The Deforestation Regulation demands geolocated proof that every sack of cocoa, coffee, palm oil or soy was grown on land not cleared after 2020, a demand that a multinational trading house can meet with satellite contracts and a compliance department of its own, while the smallholder in Côte d'Ivoire or Sumatra, who has neither, finds himself shut out of the market he has supplied for generations, and when Indonesia and Malaysia protested loudly enough that Brussels postponed the regulation, the postponement only revealed for whose convenience it had been written in the first place. The Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, for its part, levies a charge on the carbon contained in imported steel, aluminium, cement and fertiliser, and so hands the bill for Europe's climate policy to the producers of India, South Africa, Ukraine and Mozambique, whose governments have denounced it as a unilateral trade barrier in green clothing, and in every one of these cases the costs of compliance flow outward while the protection flows inward, leaving the European producer who already meets the standard to watch his foreign rival hobbled by law.

None of this means, however, that the Union shields itself by keeping its capital at home. Article 63 TFEU forbids restrictions on the movement of capital not only among the member states but between them and every third country on earth, which makes it the only one of the four freedoms that reaches across the whole globe, and through it the Union guarantees by treaty the free departure of all the capital that can no longer find a profitable use within its borders. The metropolitan state does not hold back its overaccumulated capital; it escorts that capital abroad and furnishes it with a legal order it can enforce on foreign soil, through the roughly 1,400 bilateral investment treaties that the member states still maintain with third countries and that an EU regulation of 2012 expressly kept alive, through the competence over foreign direct investment that the Treaty of Lisbon transferred to the Union's common commercial policy, and through the chapters on investment protection and dispute settlement written into every new trade agreement, whether they rely on the old arbitral tribunals or on the "Investment Court System" agreed with Canada, so that European capital leaves the continent freely and carries European law with it wherever it settles.

The Brussels effect therefore serves as protectionism and as world regulation at one and the same time, shielding the home market against the goods of the periphery while standardising the foreign markets for the capital of the centre, raising walls against the commodities of the poor countries while throwing open their soil, their labour and their public contracts to European investment. The very standard that keeps the Ivorian cocoa farmer out of the port of Hamburg was met long ago by the European trading house that owns the warehouses in Abidjan, and what the textbooks praise as regulatory leadership turns out, on closer inspection, to be the old division of labour between metropole and periphery, written this time in the language of consumer protection and the environment.

Part Three: The euro, money of an aspiring world power


The economists, and this term certainly isn’t used positively here, describe money as a medium of exchange, a unit of account and a store of value, and they leave out the one function that matters most in the world market, where money serves as the form in which the capital of one state lays claim to the labour of the whole globe. A currency the world is obliged to hold and use is a weapon of the first rank, the atomic bomb of the bourgeois order. The state that issues it can borrow without limit in its own coin, finance its deficits with the savings of foreigners, push the costs of its crises onto everyone who holds its money, and shut its enemies out of world trade by closing its payment systems to them. Since 1945, both atomic bombs have thus rested in the hands of the United States.


The European bourgeoisies learned at their own expense what it means to live in the shadow of the dollar. When Washington cut the dollar loose from gold in 1971 to finance its thuggish “World Police” doctrine, when American interest rates climbed to twenty percent at the start of the 1980s, when the dollar swung by a third within a few years, the shock ran through every European exporter and every European budget. Each crisis of the dollar turned into a crisis among European currencies; capital fled into the Deutsche Mark, the franc and the lira came under siege, and Paris and Rome discovered that their policy was being written at the Bundesbank in Frankfurt, that German imperialism and capital were, once again, on their way to dominating Europe. The euro was devised to answer both humiliations at once, ending the currency war among the member states at home and creating abroad a money backed by an economic area comparable to the American, a money that already, together with other rising powers such as the Chinese Renminbi, disputes with the dollar its throne.


The ambition remains yet unfulfilled, though certainly nobody has abandoned it. According to the IMF, the euro made up 20.6 percent of the world's official foreign exchange reserves in the second quarter of 2026, against 56.7 percent for the dollar, and its share rose in that quarter mainly because central banks were actively buying euro assets. A currency rises to world money when the state behind it can guarantee that claims written in it will be honoured in every circumstance, through a deep market for its sovereign debt, through a central bank prepared to act as lender of last resort, and at the far end of the chain through armed force that secures the order in which those claims circulate. The eurozone itself has no single state debt, its central bank was forbidden by treaty to finance governments, and its armed force has been, so far, on loan from NATO for seventy years, although of course the EU has made significant efforts since the 2000s to establish itself as a sovereign and united military power, ready to defend its interests. Hence the clamour in the chancelleries and central banks for a "global euro moment", for common European bonds, for a capital market as deep as New York's and for a European army.


However, all this does not stop the euro from already serving as a weapon, and its edges have already been tested. In 2022, the Union froze the reserves of the Russian central bank held on its territory, most of them at Euroclear in Brussels, which holds around €185 billion. In December 2025, it decided to keep them frozen indefinitely and opened a debate on lending the money to Ukraine as an advance on Russian reparations, while taking great care never to pronounce the word confiscation. Whatever one makes of the war, every state on earth has drawn from this action the obvious, and most definitely intended, conclusion that reserves held in euros remain the property of their owner for only as long as Brussels approves of his conduct, and that the issuer of a world money decides who may take part in “their” world market and on what terms.


Inside the eurozone the common currency performs a different service, although no gentler for being less visible. A member state can no longer devalue to restore the competitiveness of its industry, nor can it have its own central bank buy its debt when the markets turn their backs. Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece were thereby placed in the position of a debtor who borrows money he cannot print, and so long as the markets treated every euro bond as equally safe, the arrangement wore a friendly face, but that the mask would come off eventually was anything but unpredictable.


Beyond the eurozone lies a monetary periphery that the Union seldom mentions in polite company. Fourteen states of West and Central Africa still use the CFA franc, created by France in 1945 and pegged today at a fixed rate to the euro, with the French Treasury standing as guarantor, so that their monetary policy is made in Frankfurt for the needs of the eurozone while they bear its consequences without a vote.


Whatever the commemorative coins may suggest about tourism and the friendship of peoples, the euro embodies the attempt of the European bourgeoisies to win for their capital the privilege that American capital already enjoys, to trade with the world in its own money and to leave the world holding the risk.

Part Four: The creditors' dictatorship in the South


In the decade before 2010 the banks of the European centre lent with both hands to the states, banks and households of the South, and the German and French houses stood first in line among the creditors. When it became clear that Greece could not service its debts, two roads lay open: a write-off at the expense of the lenders, or the transfer of the debt from private banks to public institutions, financed with fresh loans to Greece and secured by enforced Greek austerity. Seeing as the first one was an unacceptable amount of solidarity and went against all the animalistic instincts of capital, the governments of Europe and the IMF chose the second road and christened it "rescue", and the bourgeois vocabulary has seldom been so inventive as when it names its own robberies.


The figures were compiled by the European School of Management and Technology in Berlin, an institute founded by German industry and hardly suspected of Marxist education or other revolutionary sympathies. Its researchers followed the €215.9 billion disbursed under the first two Greek programmes and found that only €9.7 billion, less than five percent, ever reached the Greek budget. €139.2 billion, more than 64 percent, went to repaying old debts and paying interest, €37.3 billion recapitalised the Greek banks, and €29.7 billion served as sweeteners to coax private creditors into the debt exchange of 2012. The president of the institute summed it up with admirable candour, saying that risk had been moved from private creditors to public ones, as if the saddling of the state did not mean the burdening of the working class through tax and austerity. The banks were paid in full, and the debt stayed behind, now owed to the states and institutions, part of the eurozone, and therefore enforceable by political means that no private lender has ever possessed.


This enforcement was thus to be carried out by the determined Troika of the Commission, ECB and IMF. Every tranche arrived with its list of conditions, cuts to pensions and public wages, mass dismissals in the public sector, the dismantling of collective bargaining, higher taxes on consumption and, above all, privatisation. The Greek economy shrank by roughly a quarter, and youth unemployment climbed to levels otherwise met with only in wartime. The authors of the programmes called these results regrettable side effects, though they followed from the design as surely as the harvest follows the sowing, since a state becomes a reliable debtor again only by forcing its population to produce a surplus that travels straight to the creditors.


Take one example: Under the privatisation plan imposed as a condition of the third programme, fourteen regional airports were handed over on a forty-year concession to Fraport Greece, a consortium 73.4 percent owned by Fraport AG of Frankfurt. The list read like a holiday brochure: Thessaloniki, Rhodes, Corfu, Kos, Chania, Mykonos, Santorini, the gates through which the tourist revenue of the Greek islands flows. Fraport paid an upfront fee of €1.234 billion plus annual charges and took over operations in April 2017. The government of Syriza, which had first frozen the deal on taking office, signed it in August 2015 as its very first privatisation, and the Italian financial press noted the joke with relish, since Fraport itself is controlled by public owners, the state of Hesse and the city of Frankfurt. The German public sector stayed public, while the Greek public sector was privatised into its hands.


The rest of the catalogue follows the same pattern. Deutsche Telekom became the controlling shareholder of OTE, the old Greek telephone monopoly, as the Greek state sold down its stake. The port of Piraeus went to the Chinese COSCO, a reminder that the European creditors do not always win the auctions they organise, and that the dispossession of the debtor serves capital in general before it serves any particular flag. In Portugal, under the programme of 2011, the airport operator ANA was sold to the French Vinci group, while stakes in the power companies EDP and REN went to Chinese state capital. Everywhere, assets built by the labour of generations were sold under duress, at prices dictated by the seller's desperation, to buyers whose profits now flow abroad.


In the summer of 2015, the Greek population was graciously permitted to give its opinion, and a large majority voted in a referendum against the creditors' terms. The reply came from the institutions of the currency, since the voters of other nations were never asked. The ECB restricted the emergency liquidity on which the Greek banks depended, the banks closed their doors, capital controls were imposed, and within days the government signed a memorandum harsher than the one the voters had rejected. The “democrats” of all Europe celebrated this victory against the people at the hands of the Troika. Marxism saw in those days a demonstration conducted under laboratory conditions, proving that in a union of capitalist states the ballot may help decide everything except the one question that matters, whether the claims of capital on the state will be honoured, a question settled before any election, by the relation of forces between classes and between states.


Cyprus in 2013 offered a variation on the theme. There the creditors decided that the insolvent banks should be rescued partly by their own depositors; uninsured deposits above €100,000 at the Bank of Cyprus were converted into shares at a loss of nearly half, and the second bank, Laiki, was wound up altogether. The bourgeoisie, which had sworn for generations that bank deposits were sacred, discovered overnight that they could be expropriated whenever the stability of the euro required it, and the world learned once more that property enjoys its sanctity only in the hands of the strong.


Ireland and Spain completed the lesson when in 2008 the Irish government guaranteed all the liabilities of its banks, including those owed to German, French and British bondholders, and in 2010 it had to accept an international programme in order to honour the guarantee, while the ECB refused to let Irish ministers impose losses on senior bondholders. In Spain in 2012 the European Stability Mechanism lent €41 billion to recapitalise the banks that had financed the property bubble, at the very moment when the families who had borrowed from those banks were being evicted in their hundreds of thousands. The losses of capital were socialised onto the working class through the state; the losses of labour became socialised twice: first through neglect & dispossession, second through the gloved fist of “legal” expropriation.


From these crises the Union built a permanent regime. The Six-Pack, the Fiscal Compact, the European Semester and the conditional lending of the European Stability Mechanism place every national budget under continuous surveillance, and even the ECB's celebrated promise of 2012 to do "whatever it takes" to save the euro came with a string attached, since any state wishing the central bank to buy its bonds must first submit to an ESM programme. The central bank defends a state against the markets only after that state has surrendered to the creditors, and this, in plain words, forms the constitution of the eurozone, which no election has legitimised and no vote can amend.


In this way, the financial expropriation machinery of the European bourgeoisie reaches its premier stage, acquiring through droll legalism an economy of scale once imagined only in the grandest delusions of Parisian usurers and German universities: the states of the Union are prohibited from breaking the unity of the cartel through unilateral industrial mergers, labour disputes or financial schemes, and are thus compelled to channel the socialisation of crises through the unified finance capital of "Europe". The socialisation of cost is therefore predominantly the consolidation of political economy into the financial-industrial belt spanning from Paris to Holland to the Ruhr. The industries of Europe's nation-states are institutionalised into appendages of European finance capital, backed by the regulatory union of the finance capitals of France, the Netherlands and Germany.

Part Five: The march of Austrian capital to the East


The West celebrated the collapse of the “Marxist-Leninist” regimes in 1989 as the victory of freedom, and the bourgeoisie of the small Austrian republic celebrated something more tangible, the reopening of the old Habsburg hinterland to Viennese capital, closed since 1918 and sealed since 1945. The Austrian central bank later described the end of communism as a historic opportunity for Austrian finance and noted with evident satisfaction that the investments had proved highly profitable. The Austrian proletarian would do well to read those words twice, and to ask himself whose opportunity it was.


The banks marched in behind the privatisations. When the old state savings banks and commercial banks of the East were put up for sale under the eye of the IMF, the World Bank and the European Commission, which made rapid privatisation a condition of credit and of EU membership alike, the buyers arrived from Vienna, Milan, Munich, Paris, Brussels and Stockholm. Erste Bank, heir to the first Viennese savings bank, took control of Česká spořitelna, the largest retail bank in Czechia, in 2000, and of Slovenská sporiteľňa in Slovakia in 2001, and pushed its network onward into Hungary, Croatia, Serbia and Ukraine.


In December 2005, Erste won the auction for Banca Comercială Română, the largest bank in Romania, with a bid of €3.75 billion for 61.88 percent of the shares, the largest Austrian investment abroad in history, financed through the largest capital increase ever seen on the Vienna stock exchange. Romania received some €2.23 billion of the proceeds, the biggest sum it had ever obtained from a privatisation, while the rest went to the EBRD and the World Bank's IFC, which had picked up stakes along the way. An Erste representative promised that the bank would do everything in its power "to bring Romania to Europe", and with the acquisition Erste counted more than fifteen million customers in a market of some 120 million people. Romania was indeed brought to Europe, or at least to European capital, and its largest bank was brought into Vienna.


Raiffeisen, the cooperative group born among the peasants of Lower Austria, travelled the same road on a grander scale. Through Raiffeisen Bank International, it built a network reaching from Czechia, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania through the Balkans, Albania and Kosovo to Belarus, Ukraine and Russia, and in Ukraine it bought Bank Aval in 2005 and turned it into one of the country's biggest lenders. Bank Austria, formed from the merger of the two great Viennese banks, was swallowed first by the Bavarian HypoVereinsbank and then, in 2005, by the Italian UniCredit, which made Vienna the command post of the largest banking network in Central and Eastern Europe. By the end of 2008 the exposure of Austrian banking groups to the East stood at around €200 billion, roughly seventy percent of Austria's gross domestic product, a ratio no other imperialist state in Europe could match, as if a whole small nation had staked its fortune on the repayment capacity of its neighbours.


And what did the banks do with their new territory? They lent, and they lent in foreign money. Households in Hungary, Romania, Croatia and Serbia were offered mortgages in Swiss francs and euros at interest rates below those of the local currency, and according to the IMF half of Austrian lending to the region was denominated in foreign currency. The bank carried no exchange-rate risk, the borrower carried all of it, and when the local currencies fell after 2008, hundreds of thousands of families watched their debt swell by a third or a half while their wages stood still. The forint sank against the franc, the installments of Hungarian workers rose in step, and the difference was booked as income in Vienna.


When the crisis struck, the European bourgeoisie showed what it had integrated the East for. In January 2009 the so-called Vienna Initiative brought the large Western banks together with the IMF, the EU and the governments concerned, and the banks pledged to maintain their exposure and recapitalise their subsidiaries in Hungary, Romania, Serbia, Bosnia and Latvia. In return, these states received programmes from the IMF and the EU on the customary conditions: cuts to public wages and pensions, tax rises, "structural reforms", and Romania cut public sector pay by a quarter in 2010. The international loans protected the solvency of the Western parent banks, and the price of the austerity attached to them was wrenched from the peoples of the debtor states, while the Austrian republic assembled a €100 billion package to guarantee its own banks. Here again, the cost of the crisis was doubly socialised upon the working class: millions left destitute, and millions more harnessed to the dual fiscal instruments of taxation and interest to maintain the extractive capacity of Viennese finance capital. 


The story of Hypo Alpe Adria shows the provincial edition of the same appetite. The regional bank of Carinthia, ruled by the nationalist Jörg Haider, spread across the Balkans and into Italy with the guarantees of the Carinthian provincial government behind it, quadrupling its balance sheet to some €40 billion through loans to hotel projects on the Croatian coast, property developers in Bosnia and leasing schemes in Serbia. In 2007, the Bavarian state bank BayernLB bought a majority for €1.6 billion; two years later the bank stood at the edge of collapse, and Austria nationalised it for a symbolic sum and dumped its bad assets into a "bad bank" called Heta. Carinthia had guaranteed more than €10 billion of Heta's debts, over four times its annual budget, and according to Austria's fiscal council the Hypo disaster will cost the Austrian taxpayer at least €11.7 billion.


The moral of Hypo Alpe Adria has little to do with Haider's people being more corrupt than the respectable gentlemen of Vienna. Haider railed against Brussels, against immigrants, against the Viennese establishment, and his bank followed exactly the same path as Erste and Raiffeisen into the markets of the former Yugoslavia, because that was where the returns lay. The nationalist and the cosmopolitan bourgeois chase the same prey with the same weapons, and nationalism serves the petty imperialisms of small states as the costume in which they parade their ambitions.


Today the Austrian banks rank once again among the most profitable in Europe, and their eastern subsidiaries supply a large share of their earnings. Erste's Czech, Slovak and Romanian units, Raiffeisen's networks from Prague to Bucharest, UniCredit's empire administered from Vienna, all serve as channels through which the interest paid by workers in a dozen countries flows towards Vienna and Milan. The workers of the East pay thrice, once as wage earners for Western industry, to which Part Six now turns, once again as debtors to Western banks, and once more as taxpayers to bail out their masters.

Part Six: The workbench and the counting house


Where the banks went, industry followed, and often enough industry went first. In 1991, barely a year after the old regime fell in Prague, Volkswagen moved into Škoda, the oldest car maker in Bohemia, and by 2000 owned all of it. In 1993 Audi opened its engine plant in Győr in Hungary, which grew into one of the largest engine factories on the planet, and in 1999 Renault took a majority in Dacia and turned the old works at Pitești into the base for a cheap car sold across Europe and beyond. Mercedes-Benz opened a plant in Kecskemét in 2012, Volkswagen assembles in Bratislava, Stellantis in Trnava, and Slovakia today produces more cars per inhabitant than any country on earth without owning a single one of the companies that build them.


German economists have coined a name for this region, the "extended workbench" of German industry, and the phrase deserves credit for its honesty. The East supplies a skilled workforce trained under the old regimes, wages at a fraction of those paid in Wolfsburg or Stuttgart, low corporate taxes, weak unions and, thanks to membership in the European Union, the same legal security that capital enjoys at home. Components cross the borders several times before a car is finished, the value added is booked wherever the brand and the patents reside, and the car assembled in Győr leaves Hungary as an export of German capital.


This time around, the banks of France, Belgium and Italy completed the picture. Société Générale took control of Komerční banka in Czechia in 2001, and of BRD in Romania; Belgium's KBC bought ČSOB in 1999 and made it the heart of its Central European business, and UniCredit, by way of Bank Austria, held Pekao in Poland, Zagrebačka banka in Croatia and a string of banks across the Balkans. According to ECB and national central bank data compiled by the Peterson Institute, foreign-owned banks controlled between 61 and 100 percent of banking assets in the region's member states in 2007, Slovenia alone excepted, and after the crisis the range had barely moved, to between 59 and 94 percent. The credit system of a whole region passed into the hands of some fifteen Western European banking groups within fifteen years, and the history of imperialism offers few examples of so complete a transfer of financial command achieved without a single gunboat.


The tribute exacted from the East has been measured. In 2018 Thomas Piketty set the outflow of profits and property income from the eastern member states beside the net transfers they receive from the EU budget. Between 2010 and 2016 the annual net outflow averaged 4.7 percent of GDP in Poland, 7.2 percent in Hungary, 7.6 percent in Czechia and 4.2 percent in Slovakia, while net EU transfers over the same years came to 2.7, 4.0, 1.9 and 2.2 percent. The economists of Brussels hastened to object that the figures included reinvested profits and the earnings of Japanese and Korean firms, an objection that concedes everything it set out to deny. The East was integrated as a field of exploitation for foreign capital, and on that point Piketty's figures and his critics' footnotes tell the same story.


What, then, are the famous cohesion funds, which the Western press presents as Europe's generosity towards its poor relations? They form the infrastructure budget of Western capital in the East, paying for motorways to the factory gates, modernised railways for supply chains, industrial parks, and vocational schools that train the workers the investors require, with contracts frequently won by Western construction firms. The East receives subsidies so that it can serve as a better site of investment, and the returns on that investment flow West, which shows once more that the charity of the bourgeoisie always comes with an interest rate.


The East supplies cheap labour in its own territory and cheap labour for export besides. Millions of workers from Poland, Romania, Bulgaria and the Baltic states moved west after accession, into the slaughterhouses of Lower Saxony and North Rhine-Westphalia, the building sites of London, the care homes of Austria, the asparagus fields of Brandenburg, many of them hired through chains of subcontractors and housed in barracks rented from their employers. When the virus broke out among the workers of a giant German meat processor in 2020, the whole country caught a brief glimpse of how its cheap sausages are made, and then looked away again. The freedom of movement that liberal Europe praises as its most humane achievement works in practice as a mobile reserve army of labour, deployed wherever Western capital needs it and sent home when the need has passed.


The national bourgeoisies of the East organised this subordination with considerable zeal, competed to offer the best terms for it, and then built political careers on the resentment it bred. The Hungarian government, which thunders against Brussels and foreign banks, passed a labour law in 2018 allowing employers to demand up to 400 hours of overtime a year, a law written with the German car plants in mind. The same government bought banks back from foreign owners and levied special taxes on those that remained, with the aim of steering a larger share of the fruits of Hungarian labour into Hungarian bourgeois pockets, while the labour itself went on being exploited exactly as before. In Poland, the state insurer and development fund bought Pekao back from UniCredit in 2017 in the name of "repolonisation", and the worker who now repays his mortgage to a Polish-owned bank instead of an Italian one has gained a flag and nothing more.


Begone with the idealisation of the national bourgeoisie: there can be no posthumous deconstruction of the class character of the action of the bourgeoisie. The national bourgeoisie stands beside foreign capital at home and abroad; like all their contemporaries, they demand a greater share of the extracted value of this world. They earn no points for flying the flag of the home state when they dispute your labour, no more than they earn flying the foreign flag when they compete for extracted value abroad. Let there be no mistake: the consolidation of finance capital concerns the bourgeoisie only in their capacity to act as monopsony purchasers of labour and in their desire to guarantee their present and future power. To the worker, there is no distinction between eviction and generational debt under a French bank or a Hungarian one. 


The integration of the East thus displays the whole structure of European imperialism in miniature. The banks of the centre own the credit system of the periphery, the industry of the centre uses the periphery as its workshop, the budget of the Union pays for the roads and the rail lines, the labour of the periphery is shipped to the centre whenever required, and the national governments of the periphery administer the whole arrangement while denouncing it from every podium.

Part Seven: Profit on both sides of the front


Few cases expose the nature of finance capital as sharply as the conduct of Raiffeisen Bank International in the war between Russia and Ukraine. The bourgeois moralist demands that capital choose a side, as though it were a citizen with a conscience and a passport, and capital, which answers only to its rate of return, collects that return wherever it can be had, on one side of the front, on the other, and preferably on both.


Raiffeisen entered Russia in the 1990s and built one of the largest foreign banks in the country, and it entered Ukraine in 2005 with the purchase of Bank Aval, so that when the war escalated in 2022 it stood in both belligerent states and in Belarus as well. The Western banks with smaller Russian businesses sold them or wrote them off, while Raiffeisen's Russian subsidiary proved far too profitable to abandon. Russian firms and individuals cut off by sanctions from much of the world's payment system needed a channel to the West; Raiffeisen remained one of the few still open, and in the first nine months of 2024 alone its Russian unit earned a profit of €1.11 billion.


The European authorities did protest: the ECB pressed the bank to shrink its Russian lending, and the bank announced year after year that it was scaling back and searching for a buyer. When Ukraine's anti-corruption agency placed Raiffeisen on its list of "international sponsors of war", Austria threatened to hold up a package of EU sanctions against Russia until the listing was lifted, and the listing was lifted. The episode deserves to be remembered. A small imperialist state stood ready to obstruct the common policy of the entire Union in order to protect the good name of its largest bank, and national finance capital outranked the "European values" that the same government invoked in every speech on Ukraine.


The Russian state, for its part, left those profits anything but in peace. A Russian court awarded damages against Raiffeisen's Russian unit in a suit brought by Rasperia Trading, and the sum was taken straight from the bank's account at the Russian central bank, so that the Russian unit showed a loss for the first nine months of 2025. The profits earned in Russia are in any case blocked there and cannot travel to Vienna, and yet, according to reports on the bank's results for the first half of 2026, the Russian business once again contributed a large share of group profit. The reality of imperialism has rarely been illustrated with such purity: two rival states wrestling over the same mass of surplus value, one with sanctions and frozen assets, the other with courts and blocked accounts, while the bank collects from both.


On the Ukrainian side of the front, the European capitals are already preparing for the peace that will follow the war. Ukraine opened its farmland to sale in 2021 under pressure from the IMF and its Western creditors, ending a moratorium that had shielded one of the largest reserves of fertile soil in the world from foreign purchase. The EU's Ukraine Facility provides up to €50 billion for 2024 to 2027, tied to reforms, the privatisation of state enterprises and the adoption of European law, and every year the governments of Europe gather at a "Ukraine Recovery Conference" where ministers, development banks and corporations discuss the opportunities of reconstruction. The ruins are still smoking, and the surveyors are already pacing out the plots.


The proletarians of Ukraine and Russia are sent to kill one another over which imperialist bloc will control the land, the mines, the ports and the banks of the territory on which they die. Raiffeisen's balance sheet tells the truth of this war more faithfully than any official speech; capital keeps careful count of its claims and has never respected the meaning of a fatherland, and when the war ends, the claims will be presented for payment, and the survivors will pay them.

Part Eight: Africa, the old colony under new management


The bourgeoisie declared colonialism dead in the 1960s and then arranged for its continuation by other means. Nowhere does the continuity show more clearly than in the relations between France and its former African possessions, and nowhere has the Union lent its name more willingly to the national ambitions of one of its members.


The CFA franc supplies the monetary skeleton of this continuity. Created in 1945 as the franc of the "French colonies of Africa", it outlived independence under a new name and is used today by fourteen states with more than 150 million inhabitants. Until 2019, the West African central bank had to deposit half of its foreign exchange reserves with the French Treasury, and French officials sat on its governing bodies. The reform announced that year by Emmanuel Macron and Côte d'Ivoire's president Alassane Ouattara promised a new name, the Eco, ended the deposit obligation and withdrew the French officials, while keeping the fixed parity with the euro and France's role as guarantor of convertibility. For French and European capital in the zone, the essential survived the reform untouched: profits earned in Abidjan, Dakar or Douala can still be converted into euros at a guaranteed rate and carried home at any moment, and for the African states monetary policy is still made in Frankfurt, for the needs of a eurozone in which the working people of neither region has a vote.


For half a century the French nuclear industry drew much of its uranium from the Aïr region of northern Niger, where the state-owned group now called Orano had worked mines since 1971, holding 63 percent of the Somaïr joint venture with the Nigerien state owning the rest. When the military government that seized power in 2023 went through the books, it claimed that Orano had taken 86.3 percent of the mine's output between 1971 and 2024. Whether or not the figure is exact, it describes the relationship of imperialism with great precision: the shares on paper saying one thing and the trucks loaded with ore saying yet another, and Niger, one of the poorest countries on earth, ranked among the three largest suppliers of uranium to the European Union before the coup.


The junta withdrew Orano's licence for the vast Imouraren deposit in 2024, took control of the mines, and in June 2025 nationalised Somaïr outright, whereupon Orano, more than ninety percent owned by the French state, launched arbitration and announced that it would claim compensation for all its damages. The European press told the story as one of military dictators, Russian influence and the rule of law. There is not a single tear to be shed for Orano or the European capitalists, and no medal for the generals in Niamey either, who have merely exchanged the foreign partner with whom they intend to share the uranium, Russia having already signalled its interest. The miners of Arlit will be exploited as they always were, under a different flag on the ore trucks.


The army that guarded these arrangements has been shown the door one country at a time. France intervened in Mali in 2013 with Operation Serval and then spread its forces across the Sahel under Operation Barkhane, in the name of the fight against jihadism, and a decade later the jihadists held more ground than before and French troops were made to leave Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and then Chad and Senegal. The French bourgeoisie reads this retreat as ingratitude and Russian manipulation, when it records in truth the exhaustion of an imperialism too small for its appetite, elbowed aside by rivals who offer weapons and protection without the accompanying sermons. Above all, it records the failure of the French state to maintain its protection racket over the West African national bourgeoisies against the rising, degenerated anti-colonial anger filtered through religious zealots and misguided revolutionaries. 


Where France withdraws, the Union steps in, United in Diversity, with European money to stabilise their capital within the region. In northern Mozambique, in the province of Cabo Delgado, TotalEnergies leads a $20 billion project to liquefy natural gas for export, which it froze in 2021 by declaring force majeure after insurgent attacks that killed and displaced many thousands of local people. The project was saved by the deployment of Rwandan troops, a deployment the European “Peace” Facility helped to pay for, and in November 2025 the consortium lifted force majeure, citing better security and continued cooperation with Rwanda. In January 2026, Total's chief executive and Mozambique's president announced the full restart, with first gas expected in 2029, and the cost of the four-year interruption, put at some $4.5 billion, was negotiated with the government so that it could be set against future taxes. The peasants of Cabo Delgado lost their land to the plant and their villages to the war; the people of Mozambique will pay for the delay through their treasury, the gas will heat European homes, and the profits will travel to the Parisian bourgeoisie.


The ports through which Africa's raw materials leave the continent long belonged, in large part, to a single French family. The Bolloré group assembled a network of port concessions, railways and logistics across West and Central Africa, from Abidjan to Douala to Lomé, often secured through warm relations with the presidents of the day, and in 2022 it sold Bolloré Africa Logistics to the shipping giant MSC for €5.7 billion. The ports changed their owners; neither the function of the ports nor that of accumulation changed.


Italian capital pursues its own path. Its national champion ENI ranks among the largest foreign producers of oil and gas in Africa, from Libya and Egypt to Congo and the offshore fields of Mozambique, and in 2024 the Meloni government launched the "Mattei Plan" for Africa, named after ENI's founder, with an initial €5.5 billion and a mixture of energy investment and cooperation on migration control. The name was chosen with care: Enrico Mattei is remembered in Italy as the man who defied the Anglo-American oil majors on behalf of Italian capital, and the Italian right now borrows his memory to dress up the pursuit of Italian energy interests in Africa as a partnership between equals.


The same pattern repeats across the continent and across the member states. Dutch and British capital in the Niger Delta, where a Dutch court of appeal held Shell's Nigerian subsidiary liable in 2021 for oil spills that had poisoned farmland and fishing grounds, German capital in the hydrogen and mining projects of Namibia, a former German colony and the scene of the first genocide of the twentieth century, Belgian capital in the copper and cobalt of the Congo. The Union's task consists in bundling these national appetites into a common policy, financing them through its development banks and guarantees, and wrapping them in the language of partnership, sustainability and "Team Europe". In this way the cartelisation of the European bourgeoisies continues...

Part Nine: The second conquest of the Americas


Spanish capital returned to Latin America five centuries after the conquistadors, carrying chequebooks where they had carried swords. The occasion was the wave of privatisations that swept the continent in the 1990s under the Washington Consensus, imposed by the IMF and the World Bank on states crippled by the debt crisis of the previous decade, and telephone companies, power utilities, oil companies, water systems and banks were sold off one after another to service foreign debt.


Telefónica bought into the privatised telephone monopolies of Argentina in 1990, then of Chile, Peru and later the São Paulo region of Brazil, and grew into one of the largest telecommunications groups in the hemisphere. Endesa and Iberdrola acquired power generation and distribution across Chile, Colombia, Brazil and Mexico, Repsol bought the Argentine oil company YPF in 1999, Santander bought banks in Mexico, Chile and Brazil, and BBVA bought Bancomer, one of Mexico's two largest banks, and made it the centre of gravity of its business. A Spanish bourgeoisie freshly emerged from the Franco dictatorship and newly admitted to the European Community found in Latin America a field of expansion its own modest home market could never have offered, and membership of the Union and the solidity of the euro gave it the credit and the standing to buy on a continental scale.


The results are written into the annual reports. In 2025 BBVA earned a record net attributable profit of €10.5 billion, of which BBVA Mexico contributed €5.26 billion, half the group's entire profit, against €4.18 billion from Spain, and in the first quarter of 2026 Mexico again out-earned the home country. The financial press describes BBVA with a phrase we need not improve upon, “a Spanish bank with a Mexican engine”. The engine runs on the interest and fees paid by Mexican wage earners and small businesses, in a country where the largest bank belongs to a foreign group and the margins far exceed anything a bank could charge in Madrid, and nowhere are the export of capital and the import of its returns more naked.


Whenever a Latin American state has tried to recover what was sold, the European bourgeoisie has shown how it understands the sanctity of property. In 2012 the Argentine government expropriated 51 percent of YPF from Repsol, declaring that the Spanish company had milked the profits and starved the investment, and Madrid and Brussels answered with outrage, threats of retaliation and solemn talk of an assault on the rule of law. In 2014 Argentina agreed to compensate Repsol with $5 billion in government bonds. When Greece was forced to sell its airports, its ports and its telephone company at clearance prices under the whip of its creditors, Brussels called it reform, and when Argentina took back its oil company and paid for it, Brussels called it theft, and any proletarian who notices the double standard will understand a great deal concerning the true purpose of this “European Project”.


The European south too has company in this. The Italian Enel absorbed Endesa, and with it a large slice of Latin America's electricity sector, and in Mexico the Spanish Iberdrola became the largest private generator of power until pressure from the Mexican government persuaded it in 2023 to sell thirteen plants to a fund backed by the Mexican state for $6 billion. Once more the national bourgeoisie of the periphery haggles with the centre over the division of spoils, and the workers who pay the electricity bills and whose labour generates the profit are consulted by neither party.


The agreement between the Union and Mercosur, signed in Asunción on 17 January 2026 after twenty-five years of negotiation, is meant to fix this division of labour in international law. Brussels celebrates it as the largest trade agreement in the Union's history and as a bulwark of "rules-based trade" against American tariffs, and its content holds no surprises, since tariffs on more than 90 percent of goods are to be abolished over ten to fifteen years, opening South American markets to European cars, machinery, chemicals and services and European markets to South American beef, soy, sugar, ores and lithium. The Mercosur states had all ratified by March 2026, while in Europe the agreement ran into the resistance of the farmers, and the European Parliament referred it to the Court of Justice.


That resistance deserves its proper name, a quarrel inside the European bourgeoisie over who pays for the gains of its exporting industries. The French and Irish farmers, small capitalists themselves who employ seasonal labour on miserable terms, fear the competition of Brazilian and Argentine agribusiness, the car makers of Germany and the chemical groups of Belgium and the Netherlands covet the South American market, and the national governments balance between them according to their electoral arithmetic. The South American proletarian in the meat-packing plants and the soy plantations and the European proletarian in the car plants and the slaughterhouses have no stake in either camp of this dispute among proprietors, only one or the other flag hanging as the banner of exploitation.

Part Ten: Raw materials, treaties and walls


The Union, as its spokesmen never tire of repeating, keeps partners where older empires kept colonies, and its dealings with the rest of the world run through association agreements, economic partnership agreements, strategic partnerships, global gateways and migration compacts, every one of them drafted in the vocabulary of mutual benefit. Beneath the vocabulary, however, the structure never varies. The Union delivers access to its market, its credit and its development funds, and the partner opens its markets, protects European investments and delivers raw materials. 


Argentina, Uruguay and Brazil were never British colonies, yet London provided almost all their sovereign credit and infrastructure capital: railways, ports, telegraphs, in exchange for duty-free access for British manufactured goods, guaranteed protections for British bondholders, and a steady flow of cheap beef, wool and grain, an arrangement the historians John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson termed "informal empire". According to data from UNCTAD, foreign direct investment stock in today's Argentina stands at $138.7 billion (roughly 45 percent of the national total), of which the European Union holds $61.02 billion, or some 44 percent. Domestically owned industries in Argentina revolve disproportionately around agricultural processing and light industry, relying directly on European manufacturers to continue operation to such a degree that 40.9 percent of all EU exports to Argentina consist of industrial machinery and transport equipment. Argentina is, as a dependency of the European Union, a semi-colony and a member of the European informal empire.


The economic partnership agreements with the states of Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific replaced the old one-sided trade preferences with "reciprocity", and reciprocity between Germany and Ghana grants Ghanaian producers the right to compete in a market they cannot seriously enter and grants European exporters the right to sell into markets whose young industries and peasant farms cannot withstand them. Frozen chicken parts, milk powder and tomato paste from Europe had ruined West African producers long before these agreements were signed, and the agreements turned the ruin to rubble. The investment chapters of the newer treaties go further still, giving European companies the right to haul states before arbitration tribunals whenever a law or a regulation dents the expected profits of their investments.


Since the pandemic and the Russo-Ukrainian war, the Commission's prose has filled with "strategic dependencies", "resilience" and "de-risking", words whose meaning is simple enough, since European capital must secure its access to the raw materials of the next industrial cycle before its American and Chinese rivals do. The Critical Raw Materials Act, in force since May 2024, sets targets for the share of lithium, cobalt, nickel, graphite, rare earths and other materials the Union must mine, process and recycle itself or obtain from "reliable partners". In 2025, the Commission designated 47 strategic projects inside the Union and 13 more outside it, in Canada, Greenland, Kazakhstan, Norway, Serbia, Ukraine, Zambia, Brazil, Madagascar, Malawi, South Africa and the United Kingdom, needing an estimated €5.5 billion in capital to get started.


Two of these partnerships reveal what the Commission means by reliable. In February 2024, the Union signed a memorandum on raw materials with Rwanda, a state that the United Nations and the government of the Congo accuse of backing the M23 militia in eastern Congo and of exporting minerals dug from the territory it controls, and the Union, which needed tin, tungsten, tantalum and gold, left the provenance of the minerals to later reports. In July 2024, it signed a raw materials partnership with Serbia in the presence of the German chancellor, clearing the way for a lithium mine in the Jadar valley that the local population had blocked with mass protests two years earlier, and the protests promptly resumed, but as expected from the state, no consequence was drawn. German car makers need lithium for their batteries for profit, the farmers of the Jadar valley need their water to survive, and the Union knows perfectly well which needs are prioritised as being strategic.


The financial arm of this policy goes by the name of Global Gateway, launched in 2021 as Europe's reply to China's Belt and Road, with the promise of mobilising hundreds of billions of euros in public and private investment across Africa, Asia and Latin America. Its method is called "de-risking": grants and EU guarantees absorb the risk of loss so that private capital can pocket the profit, and Ursula von der Leyen described its purpose without disguise, calling Global Gateway above all a geopolitical project to position Europe in international competition. The roads, ports, power lines and mines it finances are chosen according to the supply chains of European industry and the rivalry with Beijing, and the people who live beside them are consulted, when at all, after the contracts have been signed.


For the states on the Union's southern and eastern rim, cooperation in stopping migrants has become a currency in which they pay for European money. The agreement with Turkey in 2016 set the pattern: billions of euros in exchange for keeping Syrian refugees on Turkish soil, and it was followed by the Libyan coast guard, trained and equipped to intercept boats and return their passengers to detention camps, by Niger, by Tunisia in 2023, by Egypt in 2024 with a package of €7.4 billion, by Mauritania. These governments are paid to imprison, deport and abandon in the desert the people Europe does not want, and the Union's agencies enter the dead in their statistics only under the inhumane heading of "irregular crossings".


Free movement for capital and walls for people are no contradiction; in fact, they belong to a single calculation. While capital crosses every border at will to seek out the lowest cost of production, the world's labour is caged by borders so that it cannot flee the misery that European credit, trade treaties and resource extraction leave behind. A rationed fraction is admitted into Europe on temporary visas, or forced through clandestine crossings into legal non-existence, in numbers set by the needs of accumulation and with rights stripped away to ensure discipline, while the vast majority is forced to remain where European capital can exploit it at peripheral wages. The border thus regulates the global price of labour power on both sides of the wire: preserving starvation wages in the semi-colonies while manufacturing a rightless underclass inside the metropolis.

Part Eleven: The brigands quarrel over the loot


Lenin once answered the dream of a peaceful "ultra-imperialism", in which the great capitals would lay down their rivalry and exploit the world jointly, by observing that every alliance among imperialists amounts to a truce between rivals, its terms fixed by the relation of forces at the moment of signing and revised whenever that relation shifts. The European Union belongs to this family of truces. Its members combine against the outside world so that they can survive and expand against the industries of America, China and the other bourgeoisies of the Union.


The hierarchy within the house is set by the size and competitiveness of each national capital and the creditworthiness of its state. Germany sits at the top as a consequence of the euro's own logic, and the relative permanence of industrial finance-capital with reference to usurers and petty finance. A common currency forecloses devaluation, so market share flows unchecked to whichever economy produces most efficiently, and German capital entered the 2000s with exactly that advantage, bolstered by the Hartz laws that drove down wages and spread precarious work across the country. The outcome was the entrenchment of a permanent German export surplus, permanent deficits in the South, and German banks recycling the surplus as loans to the South, and when the bubble burst, Germany held the IOUs, and the creditor's terms became the Union's law.


France reads the same project from the other end. For Paris, Europe was always meant to serve as the lever by which a declining power with a nuclear arsenal, a permanent seat on the Security Council and a sphere of influence in Africa could restore itself as a world player, and its demands for a European budget, common debt, a European industrial policy and "strategic autonomy" express the ambition to turn the Union into a state with French priorities. Its weakness lies in its economy and its public finances, which force it again and again to bow to the creditor's discipline it would dearly like to soften, and the "Franco-German engine" amounts to a permanent negotiation between two rival claims on the same instrument.


The rivalry reaches into the very heart of finance capital. The Commission and the ECB call for cross-border bank mergers to create European champions able to stand up to Wall Street, and in March 2026 a Commission spokesman repeated that such consolidation would raise the efficiency and profitability of banks. Yet when UniCredit of Milan began buying shares in Commerzbank in 2024, the German government declared a hostile takeover unacceptable, and when UniCredit launched an offer in March 2026 to lift its stake above the 30 percent threshold, the head of Commerzbank's works council called it "the next step in shamelessness". In June 2026, on the last day of the acceptance period, the German finance agency refused to tender the state's stake of about 12 percent and declared that Commerzbank had to be protected for its role in financing German small and medium-sized firms and its importance to Frankfurt as a financial centre. By July, UniCredit held 47.6 percent and waited for the ECB to recognise its control. The German argument gives the game away, since German industry wants a bank that answers to German interests, and the banking union, which was supposed to cut the cord between banks and their nation states, stops dead wherever a bank belongs to a national arsenal of power.


The same comedy has been staged in every capital. In 2017 the French government temporarily nationalised the shipyards of Saint-Nazaire to keep the Italian state-controlled Fincantieri from taking a majority, the Spanish government attached conditions to BBVA's hostile bid for Banco Sabadell, which failed in 2025, and the Italian government used its "golden power" to impose conditions on UniCredit's bid for Banco BPM, which UniCredit then dropped. Each of these governments signs declarations in Brussels in favour of the single market and the capital markets union, and each blocks at home the takeover of its own champions by those of its partners, with a straight face and a clear conscience.


The quarrel between Bavaria and Austria over the corpse of Hypo Alpe Adria supplied the provincial farce. After Austria nationalised the bank, BayernLB demanded repayment of €2.4 billion it had lent its former subsidiary, and Austria countersued for €3.5 billion, accusing Bavaria of hiding the bank's true condition. Two neighbours governed by conservative Catholic parties, both loyal members of the Union, fought each other in the courts for years over who would carry the losses of their shared adventure in the Balkans, before settling in 2015, and the taxpayers of both paid while the bondholders were largely spared.


The so-called "frugal" states, the Netherlands, Austria and the Nordic countries, oppose any form of transfer union because their financial sectors prosper on a hard currency and their governments refuse to pay for anyone else, while the states of the South demand common debt because they cannot otherwise borrow on equal terms, and Poland and the Baltic states push for maximum confrontation with Russia because their weight in the alliance depends on the imminence of the threat. These positions owe nothing to national character or political culture. Each expresses the place of a national capital and its state in a competition that the Union organises without ever abolishing, and which, under sufficient pressure, will tear the Union apart.

Part Twelve: The war economy


For decades the admirers of the Union described it as a "civilian power" that shaped the world through trade, law and example, a description that was half true at best. The member states had merely handed their force to NATO and the United States for safekeeping, while France and Britain kept their own for their interventions in Africa and the Middle East. What changed after 2022 was Europe's confidence that someone else would go on wielding force on its behalf, and that confidence has now evaporated.


The turn came with remarkable speed. On 4 March 2025 Ursula von der Leyen unveiled the ReArm Europe plan, later renamed "Readiness 2030" because some governments found the original title a little too frank, with the aim of unlocking more than €800 billion in military spending, chiefly by allowing member states to exempt arms expenditure from the fiscal rules, and with a new instrument called SAFE offering up to €150 billion in loans financed by joint EU borrowing. The allocations sketch the geography of the coming war: Poland €43.7 billion, Romania €16.7 billion, France and Hungary €16.2 billion each, Italy €14.9 billion, followed by Belgium, Lithuania, Portugal and Latvia. Between February and April 2026, the Council approved funding for eighteen member states, and Poland received its first payment of €6.6 billion at the end of May. That Hungary, whose government obstructs every European measure in support of Ukraine, should draw as much as France from a fund justified by the Russian threat says a good deal about how loosely the official justification is tied to the distribution of the money.


In the same month that ReArm was announced, the German Bundestag amended the Basic Law to exempt military spending above one percent of GDP from the debt brake, the very rule Germany had held up as a model for all Europe and pressed on Greece through the fiscal compact. In June 2025, the NATO states, the European members included, pledged to raise military and security-related spending to five percent of GDP by 2035, and the Union now boasts a commissioner for defence, an industrial strategy for armaments and a white paper on "defence readiness".


Set this beside the elaborations within Part Four, and the picture needs no commentary. The governments that spent fifteen years telling their populations there was no money for pensions, hospitals and schools, that compelled Greece to sell its airports in order to pay its creditors, discovered within a few weeks that hundreds of billions could be borrowed for weapons. The fiscal rules, which had never bent an inch for the unemployed of the South, bent at once for tanks and missiles, and this reveals what the rules served from the start. They concerned how state credit is used, and credit that serves state power and industry profits counts as sound by definition, while credit that merely keeps proletarians alive counts as a burden to be cut.


Why now? The official answer is Russia. Russia's war against Ukraine is a war between two bourgeois states over territory, resources, workers, and spheres of influence, and the European Union stands in it directly, with interests of its own. Ukraine was the object of rivalry between the Union and Russia long before 2022, and the association agreement that sparked the crisis of 2013 and 2014 turned on the question of whether Ukraine would belong to the European or Russian economic sphere. Part Seven showed what the European capitals have in mind for Ukraine's land, its enterprises and its reconstruction. The war is being fought over whether one of Europe's largest reserves of farmland, ore and labour will belong to the European sphere or the Russian, and the Union's determination to win it, down to turning Russia's frozen reserves against it, expresses the resolve of an imperialist power to concede no sphere of influence.


The second reason sits in the newfound bluntness of Washington’s foreign policy. Since the United States made plain that its protection comes with conditions, that it expects Europe to buy American weapons, and to manage continental defence itself while doing so, the European bourgeoisies have reached the limit of toleration with regard to their old arrangement. A power whose security hangs on another's goodwill can conduct no world policy of its own, and the ambition to count as a world power, which until now rested on the market and the currency, now demands an armed fist of its own. Hence the insistence that the new money be spent with European producers, the preference given in SAFE to the European defence industry, and the transformation of Rheinmetall, Leonardo, Thales, Saab and their suppliers into darlings of the stock exchange. The banks and fund managers who only yesterday excluded armaments from their "sustainable" portfolios have since discovered that the decade-old slogan called the “defence of democracy” offers an excellent return. The first Trump administration showed that Europe’s status as an American protectorate could deteriorate for periods; Trump made little pretence that America felt an obligation to protect Europe from Russia. Though Biden's election restored some confidence, Trump’s second term decisively shattered the comfortable illusion that Europe’s dependency on America produced reciprocal defence. Trump's second election reinforced that the American state does not see itself as a mechanism for defending interests within the European Union; from the perspective of the American bourgeoisie, the modern arrangement is that European industries and wealth must be responsible for protecting themselves.


The militarisation of the Union completes the logic traced through every part of this text. An alliance that organises markets, money and credit for its capital across the globe must in the end be able to defend them with force, and as long as the United States guaranteed the world order in which European capital did its business, Europe could leave that task to Washington. With the order fraying and its guarantor treating allies as rivals, Europe forges its own sword. The phrases about "peace through strength" and "defending our values" accompany the forging as similar phrases accompanied every rearmament of the past century, in 1914 as in 1939. The proletarians who will pay for it, with cuts to social spending, with higher taxes and, when the hour strikes, with their lives, are told that all this is for their protection, while it protects in truth a world order in which they appear only as the source of the wealth that others own.

Part Thirteen: Against all fronts


The full account can now be drawn up quite easily. The European Union serves as the political form in which Europe's bourgeoisie organise the competition of their capitals at home and their power abroad. The single market and Article 63 give capital a continental home and the right to go wherever the return is highest; the euro gives it a money that aspires to rival the dollar and turns every member state into a debtor answerable to that money, and the creditors' regime ensures that the debts are paid by the proletariat of the debtor states, from Athens to Nicosia to Lisbon. The conquest of the East delivered the credit systems of a dozen states to the banks of Vienna, Milan, Paris and Brussels, and their factory floors to the car makers of Wolfsburg, Ingolstadt and Boulogne-Billancourt. Raiffeisen collects profits on both sides of a front where proletarians die, Orano and TotalEnergies dig and drill in Africa under the protection of European arms, BBVA earns half its profit in Mexico, the treaties lock in the division of labour, the raw materials laws secure the minerals, and the migration compacts raise the walls. Inside the alliance, the brigands quarrel over the loot, and towards the outside they arm themselves to defend it. Every one of these features belongs to the European idea as faithfully as the flag and the anthem do.


From this account, the first conclusion follows: no "other Europe" can ever be built inside this framework. The demand for a social Europe, a democratic Europe, a Europe of solidarity or a Europe of the peoples accepts the Union as its frame and then asks it to pursue aims for which it was never constructed. A union of capitalist states will be social to the extent that social spending serves the competitiveness of its capital, and democratic to the extent that elections leave the claims of creditors untouched. The Greek summer of 2015 should have buried this illusion for good, and the reformist left that survived it has learned nothing, because its function is to keep the proletariat inside the democratic arena, where it can always be outvoted, outmanoeuvred, and, if need be, starved into submission.


The second conclusion concerns the nation, to which the nationalists of right and left would have us return. They blame Brussels for every injustice and present the national state as its people's protector against foreign capital and foreign bureaucrats, though the national state has written every page of what the Union does. National governments adopted every regulation, national finance ministers negotiated every austerity programme, and the same governments that denounce Brussels at home decided every trade treaty, migration deal, and arms programme. Haider's bank, Orbán's labour law and Meloni's Mattei Plan show nationalism at work as the native tongue of imperialism in the small and middle states, and a Hungary, an Italy or a France outside the Union would remain every bit as capitalist and imperialist, only weaker, while its proletariat paid for the weakness in another currency.


The third conclusion forbids the proletariat to choose between imperialist camps. Washington, Beijing and Moscow pursue the same ends as Brussels with the means at their disposal, and whoever hails Russia as an anti-imperialist force because it opposes NATO, or China as a model of development because it competes with the West, or the junta in Niamey as a liberator because it expelled Orano, has simply chosen a different master. The same judgement falls on the European left that rallies behind "its" Union in the war in the name of “democracy against autocracy”, truly, a line of argument that would generate enough electricity for the entire world were we to use Liebknecht’s spinning corpse. Every war between capitalist states is waged against the proletariat; thus it is the duty of a socialist party and platform to stand in defence of that proletariat, not of its masters or their institutions. The socialist movement cannot be “pro-Ukraine” nor can it be “pro-Russia”, for the socialist movement cannot be anti-proletarian, and thus cannot stand for imperialist conflict or any one side within it.


The fourth conclusion concerns pacifism, which deplores rearmament and pleads for disarmament, negotiation, and diplomacy, as though war were merely a policy mistake that wiser men could correct. War continues the competition of capitals by other means, and as long as that competition endures, rearmament will follow the cycles of accumulation as faithfully as crash follows boom. A demand for peace that leaves capitalism standing is a petition addressed to the very powers actively preparing the war. Russia is at war with Ukraine because when the post-Soviet bloc came up for redivision, the new Russian bourgeoisie could not claim the predominance they believed they were owed. It is as it was in 1914: the bourgeois who lose at peace will try to win at war.


Against the democratic illusion it must be said once more that the state, national or supranational, elected or appointed, serves as the instrument of the ruling class. The parliament in Strasbourg and the parliaments in the national capitals govern capital about as much as a weathervane governs the wind, and capital governs through them. The bourgeoisie gladly lets the proletariat vote, provided the vote changes nothing; wherever it threatens real change, as in Athens in 2015, the bank, the bond market, and the central bank override the vote; and where finance alone does not suffice, the police and the army are called upon to finish the job. None of this is an argument against democracy, only against its bourgeois counterfeit, in which elections are permitted on every question except property. The working class needs democracy more consistently than any class before it, since it is the majority and can rule only as a majority, and for that reason it cannot be content with a parliament that governs nothing and a constitution it may not amend.


The critique of the European Union therefore begins at the moment one stops asking how Europe might be made fairer and starts asking why the class that produces all its wealth should go on accepting a society in which that wealth serves as the means of its own subjection. The Romanian mortgage debtor of Erste, the Slovak assembly worker of Volkswagen, the Greek pensioner, the Mexican client of BBVA, the miner of Arlit, the peasant of Cabo Delgado, the Polish meat cutter in Lower Saxony, and the German wage earner whose pay was held down so that German exports could conquer the South, belong to one class exploited by one system and divided by the borders and flags of its exploiters.


Thus, the alternative remains. Socialism means the abolition of capital itself, of wage labour, of the commodity, of money, of the market and of the state that guarantees them, and simply a fairer distribution of capitalism's products can never be our programme. It cannot be built in one country, nor on one continent, nor by any coalition of national governments. It requires the international organisation of the proletariat around the programme socialists have defended since the 19th century, independent of every bourgeois party, every parliamentary combination and every national front, and must aim towards the overthrow of the bourgeois order by the united productive class.  


Between the present order and that goal lies the question of power. The abolition of capital, of wage labour and of the money economy cannot be decreed by a parliament that capital governs, nor by a single national government that the bond market can starve and the Union can discipline within a week. These measures can be carried out only once the working class comes to predominance, and since the bourgeoisie of this continent has reorganised its rule onto a European scale, the working class must take power on a European scale. That means the rule of the working-class majority across the whole continent, exercised through direct organs it elects, controls and can recall at any moment. This is no socialism on one continent, which the preceding paragraph rightly rejects, but the ground on which the European working class takes power and from which it will carry the international struggle abroad.


The fight for the republic begins with demands that the working class can raise today, that no bourgeois government can grant without undermining its own rule, and that each bring the working class closer to power: The abolition of the European Council, the European Commission and the treaties that place capital, the budget and the right to strike beyond the reach of the majority, together with the power of any court to overrule the elected representatives of the working people. A single, sovereign European Assembly, filled with delegates from Community Councils and Workplace Committees across the whole continent and holding all legislative and executive power, with officials who are elected, subject to immediate recall and paid no more than a worker's wage. A complete break with NATO and the dissolution of the Union's military instruments from the European Peace Facility to SAFE. The abolition of Frontex and the migration compacts, and full and equal political rights for every person who lives and works in Europe.


None of these demands can be won from the existing institutions as a concession, and none is offered as a plan to reform them. The only way to achieve this is the building of a single, unified European Workers' Party, organised across every border and independent of every bourgeois party, as the instrument through which the unified working class fights for these demands and takes power. The proletariat will through it build itself the path along which it organises itself as the ruling class of a continent, and once it can do so on a European scale, the overthrow of the bourgeois order passes from the programme into the order of the day. This party, a mass organisation concentrating the will and historical purpose of the working class, will ensure that the day comes when the instalments stop, in Athens or Bucharest, in Győr or Arlit, in Mexico City or in the slaughterhouses of Lower Saxony, and on that day the question will be put again that the bourgeoisie believed it had settled in 1989, whether the wealth produced by the many shall go on serving as the chain that binds them, or whether those who produce it will finally take it into their own hands, across every border their masters have drawn, and leave the claims of capital where they belong, unpaid, in the ledgers of a dead order. 





Comments

  1. mgnghh~ yeah imperialisticaly exploit me~~

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  3. Суч а низэ артиклэ комрадэ. Кип спреадинг оур пропаганда.

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  4. max please fuck me IMMEDIATELY

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  5. max I beg you breed me and put a child in me

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  6. where do i unleash the barbarian horde

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